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COMMENT
Restoring School Prayer by Eliminating Judicial Review: An
Examination of Congressional Power to Limit Federal
Court Jurisdiction
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the ratification of the United States Constitution the legislative and
judicial branches of the federal government have engaged in recurring con-
flicts over their relative power and respective areas of authority. Within the
past several decades the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the role of the
judicial branch through constitutional interpretations providing legal rights
and remedies in areas previously considered to be matters of policy within the
control of Congress and the individual states. Many of these Supreme Court
holdings have concerned controversial issues and have sparked vocal opposi-
tion and widespread efforts to blunt their impact. One tactic employed in-
creasingly by members of Congress to overcome the effects of these Court
decisions has been the introduction of proposals to limit federal court jurisdic-
tion.' These bills are designed to remove federal district court or Supreme
Court jurisdiction over specific matters about which the federal courts have
made rulings or fashioned remedies considered objectionable.
In recent years the areas in which members of Congress have sought to
restrict federal court jurisdiction include state and local regulation of subver-
sive activities,2 state apportionment of legislative districts,3 standards for the
use of confessions in criminal trials,4 state court obscenity rulings,5 local deci-
1. More than sixty bills to limit federal court jurisdiction were introduced between 1953 and
1968. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Weschsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 360 (2d ed. 1973). Approximately two dozen such proposals are pending
in the Ninety-seventh Congress, including the following: S. 158, S. 481, S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S.
1741, S. 1742, S. 1743, H.R. 72, H.R. 73, H.R. 114, H.R. 326, H.R. 408, H.R. 761, H.R. 865, H.R.
867, H.R. 869, H.R. 989, H.R. 1079, H.R. 1180, H.RI 1335, H.R 2347, H.R. 2365, H.R. 2791, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
See Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 925 (1965) (histori-
cal and statistical analysis of congressional attempts to limit the power of the Supreme Court).
2. See S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The Jenner Amendment was inspired by Mc-
Carthy era sentiment and further fueled by Supreme Court decisions protecting those persecuted.
See Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 Notre Dame Law. 597 (1958).
3. See H.R. 3238, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11,926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
These bills were proposed to counter the reapportionment cases of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. See S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). This proposal by former North Carolina Senator
Ervin was to be added to the 1968 Crime Control Bill. It was designed to overcome the decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), mandating safeguards for the use of confessions in
criminal cases.
5. See H.R. 81, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. 4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). These bills
were inspired by expanded Supreme Court protection of publications attacked as obscene. See,
e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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sions regarding school busing,6 laws regulating abortion,7 and cases concern-
ing prayer in the public schools.8 This list of some of the most controversial
current issues with which the federal courts have dealt highlights the fact that
the success and ultimate constitutionality of these congressional attempts to
remove jurisdiction have critical implications beyond the resolution of these
specific issues. These bills strike at the independence and viability of courts,
and particularly the Supreme Court, as the ultimate defenders of the individ-
ual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.9
II. THE VOLUNTARY SCHOOL PRAYER ACT
Although none of these bills has yet been enacted, and therefore the
Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to determine the legitimacy of
such a measure, recognition of the ramifications of these bills has sparked con-
siderable debate among legal scholars concerning their constitutionality.10 In
further exploring the potential effects and constitutional validity of these pro-
posals to limit federal court jurisdiction, analysis of one bill provides a useful
vehicle for clariying the issues involved. The bill, titled the Voluntary School
Prayer Act of 198111 and sponsored by Senator Helms of North Carolina, is an
attempt to remove federal court jurisdiction over cases concerning "voluntary
prayers in public schools and public buildings." 12 This representative attack
6. See H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). This bill, recommended by President Nixon,
provided that no desegregation order could increase the amount of busing in a given school dis-
trict. A companion bill, H.R. 13,916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), proposed a moratorium on fed-
eral judicial busing orders. Federal court busing orders such as the one upheld in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), prompted these proposals. A revival of
this sentiment in the Ninety-seventh Congress has produced two bills to limit busing. A bill
drafted by Senator Helms of North Carolina would prohibit any federal district court busing
orders to achieve racial balance. See S. 1743, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). The Neighborhood
School Act of 1981, proposed by Senator Johnston, would restrict busing to that school closest to a
student's home, subject to certain exceptions. This bill was approved by the Senate by a vote of 58
to 38 on February 4, 1982 as an amendment to a Department of Justice appropriations bill. See
128 Cong. Rec. S319-414 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1982).
7. See H.R. 933, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). This proposal was designed to counter Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which restricted state laws prohibiting abortion.
8. See notes 12 & 13 infra.
9. Much debate in the media has focused on these bills restricting judicial protection of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Buchanan, How Supreme Is the Court?, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 16,
1979. This editorial was submitted by Senator Garn for inclusion in the Congressional Record
after the Senate passed the Helms Amendment. See 125 Cong. Rec. S5670-71 (daily ed. May 10,
1979).
See also Time, Sept. 28, 1981, at 93.
10. See, e.g., R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (1969); Brant, Appellate Jurisdic-
tion: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 Or. L. Rev. 3 (1973); Forkosch, The
Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III and a Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the
Latter Be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?, 72 W. Va. L. Rev. 238 (1970);
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialec-
tic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960); Strong, Rx for a Nagging Constitutional Head-
ache, 8 San Diego L. Rev. 246 (1971); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L.
Rev. 1001 (1965). See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
11. S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S1284 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981).
12. The relevant text of the bill follows:
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on controversial Supreme Court holdings has been chosen as a focus because
it almost passed the Ninety-sixth Congress 13 and has been reintroduced in the
Ninety-seventh Congress.' 4 It is also a useful example because, unlike some
jurisdiction-limiting bills, the Voluntary School Prayer Act removes both fed-
eral district court and Supreme Court review of a class of cases.
By eliminating federal court challenges to state-sponsored school prayer,
the Helms bill is designed both to circumvent and to prevent further extension
of United States Supreme Court decisions restricting school prayer.'5 Two
landmark Supreme Court cases, Engle v. Vitale16 and School District v.
Schempp (Abington School District),17 define the law concerning prayer in
public schools. In these cases the Court held that public schools could not
support or advance religion by requiring prayer or Bible reading at the begin-
ning of each day.' 8 The Court ruled that laws requiring schools to present this
material, with or without compulsory participation by each student, violate the
Sec. 2. (a) Chapter 81 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
"§ 1259. Appellate jurisdiction; limitations
"(a) Notwithstanding the provision of sections 1253, 1254, and 1257 of this chapter
the Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or
otherwise, any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance, rule, regulations, or any
part thereof, or arising out of any act interpreting, applying, or enforcing a State statute,
ordinance, rule, or regulation, which relates to voluntary prayers in public schools and
public buildings.
"For the purposes of this section, the term 'voluntary prayer' shall not include any
prayer composed by an official or any employee of a state or local governmental
agency.".
(b) The section analysis at the beginning of chapter 81 of such title 28 is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
"1259. Appellate jurisdiction; limitations.".
Sec. 3. (a) Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
"§ 1364. Limitations on jurisdiction
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the district courts shall not have juris-
diction of any case or question which the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to
review under section 1259 of this title.".
(b) The section analysis at the beginning of chapter 85 of such title 28 is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
"1364. Limitations on jurisdiction.".
Sec. 4. The amendments made by sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act, except that such amendments shall not apply with
respect to any case which, on such date of enactment, was pending in any court of the
United States.
Id.
13. See S. 450, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). This earlier bill, known as the Helms Amend-
ment, originally was attached to S. 210, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which created the Depart-
ment of Education. Before passage, the Amendment was transferred to S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st
Seass. (1979), a bill designed to give the Supreme Court more control over its docket by converting
all appeals to certiorari or discretionary jurisdiction. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-
one to forty but stalled in the House Judiciary Committee a few dozen signatures short of the
majority necessary to bring it to the floor for a vote.
14. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
15. 125 Cong. Rec. S4128-31 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
16. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
17. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
18. Abington School Dist., 374 U.S. at 223-25; Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-25.
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United States Constitution's first amendment prohibition against government
"establishment of religion."' 9 The advocates of the Helms bill theorize that by
removing the jurisdiction of the federal courts over school prayer cases, the
bill would allow states to restore school-sanctioned prayers free from the
threat of federal court enforcement of the limits enunciated in Engle and Ab-
ington SchoolDistrict.20 Although purporting to restore "the true spirit of the
first amendment" and "the fundamental right of voluntary prayer in the pub-
lic schools," 2' the proposed bill, in the opinion of many, would restrict uncon-
stitutionally the power of the federal courts to interpret the United States
Constitution.22
In examining the constitutionality of Senator Helms' bill, it is necessary
first to consider the guidance provided by the Constitution's provisions estab-
lishing the federal judiciary. The scope of authority of the federal judiciary is
set out in article III of the United States Constitution. The first sentence of
article III, section 2 declares that the judicial power of the federal courts "ex-
tends to All Cases in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution .... -23
Claims that school prayer violates the first and fourteenth amendments clearly
fall within this category of cases. Helms bill advocates claim, however, that
other language in article III limits this grant of power to the federal courts by
authorizing congressional revocation of jurisdiction.24 Because the Helms bill
denies jurisdiction over school prayer cases to both the federal district court
and the Supreme Court,25 and because the power of Congress over these two
jurisdictional levels derives from separate clauses,26 they must be considered
separately.
19. Abington School Dist., 374 U.S. at 223-25; Engle, 370 U.S. at 424-25. See U.S. Const.
amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... "
20. State courts would still provide a forum for suits challenging school-sanctioned prayer.
Presumably, however, some state courts would differ in their future application of Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the establishment clause. State court departure from these decisions would
be required for the Helms bill to effect any change in the status of school prayer. Its sponsors must
be anticipating that at least some state courts will ignore the Supreme Court precedents of Engle
and Abington SchoolDistrict. See 127 Cong. Rec. S1281-84 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981) (remarks of
Sen. Helms).
21. 125 id. S4130 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
22. For example, this conclusion was reached by John M. Harmon, former Assistant Attor-
ney General. Hearings on S. 450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-37 (1980)
(statement of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General).
23. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
24. See 127 Cong. Rec. S1283 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 125 id.
S4130-31 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
25. See note 12 supra for text of the bill. Proposed section 1259 of title 28 of the United
States Code would remove Supreme Court jurisdiction over school prayer cases, and section 1364
would remove district court jurisdiction.
26. Congressional control over the scope of lower federal court jurisdiction derives from arti-
cle III, section 1, while control over Supreme Court jurisdiction derives from article III, section 2,
clause 2.
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III. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO WITHDRAW FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
The language of article III indicates that the framers of the Constitution
intended Congress to have broad power over the scope of the lower federal
court system. Article III, section 1 provides that "[tihe judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 27 Thus,
the federal judicial power vested in the Supreme Court may be supplemented
by the establishment of lower federal courts by Congress. This view of con-
gressional descretion over the existence of federal district courts has been sup-
ported by the Supreme Court.28 As a corollary, the Supreme Court also has
held that Congress can withdraw federal district court jurisdiction from an
entire class of cases, at least in some circumstances. 29 For example, adminis-
trative tribunals set up by congressional acts have replaced federal district
court jurisdiction over specific types of cases.30
Under this traditional view of federal judicial power, if the Voluntary
School Prayer Act only denied the federal district courts jurisdiction over vol-
untary prayer cases without imposing the same restriction on the Supreme
Court, the requirements of article III would be satisfied. State courts would
still be available to provide an initial forum for claims challenging the consti-
tutionality of state authorization of school prayer. State court holdings could
be given final review in a federal forum, the Supreme Court. Presumably, this
possibility of final review would provide adequately for federal judicial power
over constitutional cases as mandated by article III, and the Court could main-
tain the supremacy of the federal Constitution by requiring a fair and uniform
adherence to the Constitution throughout the entire nation.3 1
Some commentators have challenged this view of congressional power to
establish and disband lower federal courts with complete discretion.3 2 They
argue that Congress is limited when it acts to deny federal courts the practical
power to vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A law that disman-
tles the entire lower federal court system would be of questionable constitu-
tional validity considering the modem federal court system's caseload. In that
situation the Supreme Court would be unable to review adequately all of the
27. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
28. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850). See generally Comment, Congressional Power Over State and Federal Court Jurisdiction:
The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline Examples, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 131, 137-43 (1974).
29. "There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdic-
tion of the inferior courts of the United States." Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330
(1938).
30. See, e.g., Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932,29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). See also Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
31. Under the original Judiciary Act of 1789 some categories of federal question cases could
only be brought in state courts, subject to review by the Supreme Court. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
32. See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83
Yale L. 498 (1974); Thompson & Pollitt, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President
Nixon's Proposed Moratorium on Busing Orders, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 809, 836-41 (1972).
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state cases to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and of federal laws. In
essence, the federal court system would be a hollow and meaningless shell.33
The Helms bill falls far short of this total disbandment, excepting only one
narrow area from the federal district courts' jurisdiction. If the bill did not
restrict final review by the Supreme Court, the increase that would occur in the
Court's caseload in reviewing all state court school prayer rulings probably
would not be sufficient to trigger a claim that the federal court system could
not handle adequately all of the cases assigned to it by article III. 34 It is im-
portant to note, however, that removal of lower federal court jurisdiction
should not be considered limitless although it might be applied legitimately to
a narrow area.
Even application to a limited area may be unconstitutional if jurisdiction
is manipulated merely to affect the outcome of cases rather than to aid in
efficient judicial administration. Removing jurisdiction as a way to circum-
vent judicial holdings is far different from setting up a neutral standard for the
exclusion of a case, such as a monetary limit. Lack of a fair opportunity to
raise a constitutional issue in a neutral forum would conflict with the procedu-
ral component of due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment. At least
one court of appeals'decision has recognized that jurisdiction cannot be
manipulated in this manner.35 If it could be demonstrated that state courts
would not follow the guidelines of Engle (as supporters of the Helms bill hope)
and that a loaded record or Supreme Court docket pressures would deny effec-
tive review, the removal of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional. 36 Apart
from the actual effect of the jurisdictional denial, the mere attempt to affect the
substantive outcome of a constitutional issue by manipulation of jurisdiction
may be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has never allowed this. 37 The
equal protection clause also would present a constitutional obstacle to removal
33. Eisenberg, supra note 32, explains the impossibility of effective review if the Supreme
Court has the sole responsibility for vindicating federal rights through appeals from state courts,
With the expansion of rights protected under the Constitution as well as other increased demands
on the federal judiciary, it is now impossible to abolish the lower federal courts. Otherwise, en-
forcement of Constitutional rights would be watered down substantially.
34. Determining exactly when too many constitutional issues have been removed from fed-
eral district court jurisdiction would be a difficult task. However, in considering allowing one
exception, it is important to note how many other jurisdiction-limiting bills have been proposed.
See notes 1-8 and accompanying text supra.
Also, the dilution of enforcement of constitutional rights that would be caused by removal of
federal district court jurisdiction in an area in which individualized remedies are an integral part
of enforcing a constitutional guarantee may be unacceptably severe. For example, Supreme Court
supervision over all school desegregation plans, without lower federal court involvement, would
be a substantially greater burden than enunciating a relatively set limit on the presence of religion
in public schools. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 32.
35. "[Wihile Congress has undoubted power to give, withhold and restrict the jurisdiction of
courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169
F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnotes omitted).
36. In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized the possi-
bility that removal of federal district court jurisdiction could result in a denial of due process if the
alternative forum could be shown in advance to be unfair. Id. at 434. See notes 99-102 and ac-
companying text infra.
37. See notes 58-70 and accompanying text infra.
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of lower federal court jurisdiction over a constitutional issue. A law eliminat-
ing lower federal court jurisdiction over one specific issue while not similarly
restricting access in cases involving other constitutional rights could result in
weakened enforcement of a particular constitutional guarantee. This effective
impingement of a constitutional right would have to be justified by a compel-
ling governmental interest.38
IV. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO WITHDRAW SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Helms bill's jurisdictional restrictions not only apply to the lower
federal courts but also deny to the United States Supreme Court the power to
review voluntary school prayer cases. The various state courts would be the
only available, and final, forums for ruling on the constitutionality of state acts
that allegedly violate the first amendment. Whatever power Congress has to
limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court derives from a clause in article III
of the Constitution known as the "exceptions clause."
As the initial step in a detailed analysis of this clause, its exact context
within the Constitution should be noted. Section 2 of article III outlines the
classes of cases over which the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction.
These classes of cases are then subdivided into those that shall fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and those that are heard under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court. Article III provides that "[in all other
cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as
the Congress Shall make. '39
A. Reconstruction Cases Dealing with Congressional Exceptions Power
Beyond relying on the language of the exceptions clause, supporters of
these jurisdiction-limiting bills claim that the Supreme Court previously has
recognized that this clause grants Congress plenary power to limit Supreme
Court jurisdiction.4° The Supreme Court case regularly cited for this proposi-
38. The purpose of the Helms bill--to hinder the enforcement of constitutional rights-
should not qualify as a legitimate governmental interest to justify this law. See Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Exparte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 264-65 (1973); Comment, Removal of
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: A Weapon Against Obscenity?, 1969 Duke L.J. 291, 310-
13.
39. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
40. See 125 Cong. Rec. S4131 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms). See also
Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1005-06.
Former Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts was so convinced of the potential power of
Congress to use the exceptions power that he proposed an amendment to the Constitution to patch
this "loophole" by altering the exceptions clause. Roberts, Fortifying the Supreme Court's Inde-
pendence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949). The text of the amendment would have changed the wording of
article III to read as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases
arising under the Constitution of the United States, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions
and under such regulations as it shall make." Proceedings of the House of Delegates: September
6-9, 1948, 34 A.B.A.J. 1069, 1072 (1948) (emphasis added).
In addition to citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), Roberts based his fears
19821
NORTH CAROLINA LW.REVIEW[Vl
tion is Exparte McCardle,41 a decision rendered at the end of the Civil War.
In McCardle the Supreme Court considered whether it had jurisdiction
over a habeas corpus case brought under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act.42 Mc-
Cardle was a civilian challenging his imprisonment by military authorities act-
ing under the Reconstruction Acts. While McCardle's habeas corpus appeal
was pending before the Supreme Court, the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act was re-
pealed.43 This was done specifically to avoid having the Supreme Court reach
the merits of the habeas corpus petition for fear that in the process of ruling on
the claim, the Court would declare the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional. 44
In a unanimous opinion, the Court, referring to the exceptions clause, declared
that it had no jurisdiction. Chief Justice Chase explained the Court's
reasoning:
The provision of the act of 1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is
hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of a positive exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legisla-
ture. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution;
and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this
court is given by express words.45
Should McCardle stand for the broad proposition that Congress has abso-
lute power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it
would clearly be a precedent for the congressional power asserted in the Vol-
untary School Prayer Act. Further analysis, however, demonstrates that such
an expansive reading of McCardle is suspect. The repeal of the 1867 Habeas
Corpus Act did not result in a complete denial of a federal forum for habeas
corpus claims. Only jurisdiction based on the 1867 Act was withdrawn, leav-
ing open an alternative avenue for habeas corpus appeals to reach the federal
courts. This avenue was the original Judiciary Act of 1789,46 which was not
affected by the repeal of the 1867 Act. The Supreme Court in McCardle rec-
ognized this and explicitly limited its holding: "The act of 1868 [did] not ex-
cept from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under
the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously
exercised." 47
on dicta in early Supreme Court cases stating that Congress rather than the Constitution grants
the Supreme Court its areas ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381 (1881), a
maritime case dealing with the review of facts by the Court. See also Durousseau v. United States,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810), in which the Court stated that it gets its power from the
Constitution but that it can be limited by acts of Congress.
41. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
42. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
43. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
44. For an in-depth discussion of the circumstances surrounding the McCardle case, see C.
Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1868, Part 1, in 6 History of the Supreme Court of
the United States 433-514 (P. Freund ed. 1971).
45. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514.
46. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
47. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515. Forkosch, supra note 10, makes the point that McCardle is more
an example of a regulation than an exception. After McCardle a means for the vindication of
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In fact, one year later, in Exparte Yerger,48 the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
invoked successfully to obtain Supreme Court jurisdiction in another habeas
corpus appeal by a civilian arrested by military authorities. Chief Justice
Chase, with the support of the identical Court that decided McCardle, made it
clear in the Yerger decision that the repeal of the 1867 Act did "not purport to
touch the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution" and imple-
mented by the Judiciary Act of 1789.49 This alternative route was still avail-
able for habeas corpus claims to reach the Supreme Court.50
In contrast, the Helms bill, by cutting off all federal review of state acts
dealing with voluntary prayer, presents a vastly different question from the
partial restrictions considered in McCardle. The totality of the Helms limita-
tions would foreclose all avenues to a federal forum for claims brought to
enforce a specific constitutional guarantee. The result would be equivalent to
excising part of the first amendment as far as the federal courts are concerned.
The broad McCardle dicta on the potency of the congressional exceptions
power, followed almost immediately by the limitation expressed in the Yerger
case, can be understood more completely in the political context of the time.
This contextual analysis is also helpful in evaluating McCardle's precedential
value for the proposition that Congress has plenary power over Supreme
Court jurisdiction. In the post-Civil War period Congress was the most asser-
tive branch of the federal government, 51 imposing its plan for Reconstruction
in the face of strong opposition by President Andrew Johnson. 52 Although the
Supreme Court tried to remain outside of this political controversy for fear of
retaliation by Congress, the Court declared unconstitutional several laws
passed by the Reconstruction Congress.53 Congress then repealed the 1867
Act granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction over McCardle's habeas corpus
petition specifically to avoid giving the Supreme Court a chance to strike down
the Reconstruction Acts. 54
Several actions in addition to this repeal demonstrate Congress' assertive-
rights by way of habeas corpus still existed. Repeal of the 1867 Act only altered the procedure for
habeas corpus appeals.
48. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
49. Id. at 105.
50. Although it was not necessary in Yerger to reach the key question of the ability of Con-
gress to except all jurisdiction over habeas corpus, the Court emphasized the fundamental nature
of the right of habeas corpus relief. Id. at 95-96. Further, the Court narrowly construed the 1868
Act as only denying the 1867 avenue of appeal and not appeals brought under the authority of the
original Judiciary Act of 1789 even though it was argued that the 1868 Act cut off all habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Id. at 96-97, 105-06.
The Court went so far as to state that even if the 1789 Act had been repealed by the 1867 Act,
it would imply that the 1868 Act revived the 1789 Act. It is also significant that the Court noted
three times that the Constitution was the source of its authority. "The jurisdiction of this court is
conferred by the Constitution.' Id. at 96. See also id. at 105-06.
51. See generally K. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction 1865-1877 (1965).
52. Id. at 83-154.
53. Examples of Supreme Court avoidance of the conflict between the President and Con-
gress include Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), and Georgia v. Stanton 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 50 (1867). However, in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the routine practice
of military trials for civilians was struck down.
54. In reference to the repeal of the 1867 Act while McCardle was pending, the Court stated,
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ness during Reconstruction. It was an inopportune time for the Court to
rebuff Congress by questioning the denial of'jurisdiction over McCardle's ap-
peal. The tension of the period is indicated by the fact that the determination
of the McCardle case was delayed by the duties of Chief Justice Chase in
presiding over the Senate's impeachment of Andrew Johnson.55 The House of
Representatives also was considering the impeachment of at least one
Supreme Court Justice.56 Congress had further shown its hostility to the
Supreme Court by the introduction of two bills designed to curb its powers.57
In light of these considerations, the Court's language in McCardle can be
viewed more as an attempt to avoid a confrontation with Congress than as a
concession that Congress had absolute power over the Court's jurisdiction.
Further doubt concerning the extent of congressional exceptions power
over Supreme Court jurisdiction is cast by another Reconstruction Era case,
United States v. Klein.58 Klein, the administrator of the estate of a Confeder-
ate whose property had been seized during the Civil War, successfully sued in
the United States Court of Claims, invoking a presidential pardon to secure
his right of recovery.59 The Supreme Court had held previously in United
States v. Padeford6° that a presidential pardon would clear the way to recov-
ery for these claims. In Klein the government appealed the recovery, invoking
an 1870 act61 designed to reverse the outcome of the Court of Claims' decision
favorable to Klein and prevent future recoveries as allowed in Padelford. The
1870 Act instructed the courts to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction claims for
recovery of property taken during the Civil War if the claim were based on a
presidential pardon. The courts were directed to consider the pardon as con-
clusive evidence of disloyalty, which would trigger the dismissal.62
In Klein the Supreme Court declared the 1870 Act unconstitutional, re-
jecting an argument based on congressional power under the exceptions
clause. The Court recognized that although phrased in terms of jurisdiction,
in reality the Act's "great and controlling purpose [was] to deny pardons
granted by the President the effect which this Court had adjudged them to
have." 63 The Court did not allow Congress to reverse the Court's construction
of a Presidential pardon by withholding jurisdiction "as a means to an end."'64
"Its language is general, but, as was universally known, its purpose was specific." 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) at 510.
55. Id. at 509.
56. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 862-63 (1868).
57. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 201, § 1, 14 Stat. 209. This Act reduced the number of Justices
on the Supreme Court from ten to seven. H.R. 379, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868), was a failed effort
to require the Supreme Court to decide by an extraordinary majority before it could invalidate a
congressional act.
58. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
59. Id. at 132.
60. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
61. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230.
62. Id.
63. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
64. Id.
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It declared that this was an unconstitutional exercise of power because Con-
gress had invaded the province of the courts to give effect to the pardon.
In the words of the Court, Congress had "passed the limit which separates
the legislative from the judicial power." 65 Although not expounding on what
might be legitimate uses of the exceptions clause, the Court held that federal
jurisdiction could not be manipulated by Congress to dictate the outcome of a
case.66 The Court prevented Congress from effectively reversing its rulings
through the use of congressional control over jurisdiction.
Although a more indirect attempt to affect the merits of a case than Klein,
the Helms bill arguably suffers from the same infirmity found unconstitutional
in 1872.67 The law struck down in Klein attempted to reverse the meaning of a
pardon. The Helms bill does not attempt to change directly the legal meaning
of evidence before a court. It does, however, deny jurisdiction over a particu-
lar issue for the purpose of altering the substantive outcome of a particular
type of case. In both situations, once the court determines that a particular set
of facts exists, the court must dismiss the case rather than proceed with an
independent inquiry into the merits of the claim.
The Supreme Court has ruled that school-sanctioned prayers violate the
first amendment.68 The avowed purpose of the Prayer Act is to circumvent
this ruling by regulating federal jurisdiction. The bill is a clear invitation to
state governments to restore prayer in public schools, and to state courts to
65. Id. at 147. The Court posed the following hypothetical: "Can it [Congress] prescribe a
rule in conformity with which the Court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, be-
cause and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the govern-
ment and favorable to the suitor? This question seems to us to answer itself." Id.
The Court noted that in addition to invading the realm of the judiciary, the Act also violated
the President's right to pardon. Id.
66. Id.
67. During the Senate debate on the Helms bill, Senator Mathias argued that the Helms bill's
real purpose and intent were similar to the situation declared to be unconstitutional in Klein. 125
Cong. Rec. S4142 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). Congress' lack of power
over the President's power to pardon can be compared to its lack of power over rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. Although Congress can repeal a statute it has previously enacted thereby
taking away federal court jurisdiction over the subject, it cannot repeal presidential pardon power
or the first amendment. Nor can Congress, according to Klein, bring about the same result by
enacting a rule of decision, whereby if certain facts exist the Court must dismiss the case. For an
analysis of the applicability of Klein to the proposed busing moratorium, see Thompson & Pollitt,
supra note 32, at 836.
See also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). A congressional act
that provided for waiver of a technical legal defense (res judicata) survived a challenge based on
Klein. The Act did not restrict the Court from deciding the substantive merits of the claim. Id. at
2736. In contrast to this, the Helms bill cuts out the heart of a substantive constitutional claim.
The federal court must dismiss the claim if based on the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, which prohibits school-sponsored prayers.
Section 4 of the Helms bill was inserted possibly as an attempt to avoid the prohibition of
jurisdiction manipulation expressed in Klein. However, as discussed above, the problem in Klein
was not that Congress enacted a statute to deny jurisdiction which would affect a pending case,
but that jurisdiction was used to affect an area over which Congress had no control. Any statutory
right can be repealed in a pending case, denying the litigant the benefit of that right. Therefore,
the fact that the case was pending in Klein cannot be the basis of the Supreme Court finding that
the jurisdictional removal was unconstitutional.
68. E.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
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uphold this practice, free from the fear of federal court reversal.69 Under the
Helms bill, any claim brought to the federal courts challenging the constitu-
tionality of state acts that authorize voluntary prayers would be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. As in Klein, the Supreme Court would be instructed to
dismiss a case once it identified the specified set of facts rather than uphold
rights previously protected by the Court. The Prayer Act therefore would de-
termine the judicial outcome of school prayer cases by guaranteeing that no
state laws or state court decisions in favor of school-sanctioned prayers could
be struck down in the federal courts as directed by Engle andAbington School
District. This manipulation of jurisdiction as a means to an end should be
accepted no more readily than the act struck down in Klein.
A fair reading of the McCardle-Yerger-Klein line of cases leads to the
conclusion that Congress does not have unbridled exceptions power as as-
serted by supporters of the Prayer Act. The current Supreme Court, in ruling
on the constitutionality of the Prayer Act, would not be constrained by these
holdings to rule in favor of Congress. Even if the dicta in McCardle could be
interpreted to voice approval of the plenary exceptions power, the current
Court would be free to ignore it because of the limits placed on it by later
Court decisions, the circumstances of the arguable judicial duress surrounding
the case, and the fact that enough time has passed that an outright overruling,
if necessary, would not seem capricious. 70 In deciding whether all federal
courts could be denied jurisdiction over a constitutional claim, the Court
would be free to make a fresh inquiry into the meaning of the exceptions
clause. In reaching a decision, the court could consider historical evidence on
the intention of the framers of the Constitution, other clauses in the Constitu-
tion that might relate to or limit the exceptions clause, as well as the general
nature of the relationship between Congress and the federal courts in our sys-
tem of government.
B. The Intent of the Framers of the Exceptions Clause
Examination of historical evidence on the meaning of the exceptions
clause has led legal writers to diverse conclusions regarding the intent of the
framers. Those who interpret the exceptions clause as a plenary grant of
power to Congress argue that the clause was inserted with an obvious and
legitimate purpose. They assert that this powerful method of congressional
control over the federal courts is part of the system of checks and balances
69. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
70. Even if the McCardle line of cases had held that Supreme Court jurisdiction could be
excepted from review of congressional acts, it would not be a precedent for the constitutional issue
raised by the Helms bill. Unlike the post-Civil War cases, which dealt with review of acts of
Congress, the Helms bill cuts off Supreme Court review of state court decisions. This type of
jurisdiction denial brings into play more compelling uniformity and supremacy considerations.
See text accompanying notes 86-96 infra.
A more pragmatic approach was suggested by an article responding to Justice Roberts' call
for a constitutional amendment, see note 40 supra, eliminating congressional exceptions power.
"The Court has overruled, or disregarded, far more convincing opinions than the McCardle opin-
ion. Why worry about it?" Grinnell, A Reply to Roberts, 35 A.B.A.J. 648, 651 (1949).
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established between the branches of government by the Constitution. 7 1 Ac-
cording to this theory, when Congress disagrees with court rulings, it can con-
trol the federal courts by not allowing them to decide particular types of cases
in the future. Conceivably, a mere congressional threat to remove jurisdiction
in the future also would be a legitimate control device, influencing the federal
courts to make rulings more in accord with the wishes of Congress.
Broad statements in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 80 may be in-
terpreted as supporting plenary exceptions power. Hamilton refers to congres-
sional power "to make such exceptions and prescribe such regulations
necessary to obviate -and remove these inconveniences" in federal judicial
power.72 The Judiciary Act of 178973 is said to be further evidence of the
intent of the framers to provide vast congressional control over the federal
courts. As the first act of Congress, the Judiciary Act outlined the scope of
jurisdiction of the various courts in the first federal judicial system. This Act
has been offered as evidence that federal juidicial power ultimately derives
from Congress, rather than from the Constitution.74 As a result of this view, a
theory arose known as the "negative pregnant" doctrine.75 The core of this
doctrine asserts that, since the federal courts (including the Supreme Court)
possess only that power which Congress chooses to grant them through judici-
ary acts, then whatever jurisdiction is not explicitly granted by Congress is
implicitly excepted. From this perspective, plenary congressional exceptions
power is a logical complement. Absolute power to take away jurisdiction logi-
cally follows from the power to grant it.
The initial premise for this conclusion, however, is that all federal judicial
power arises only through acts of Congress rather than from the Constitution
71. During debate in the Senate, Senator Helms argued that the framers gave Congress ex-
ceptions power "in anticipation of judicial usurpations by the Supreme Court." 125 Cong. Rec.
S4130 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979). See also Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1005-06.
This hypothesis avoids the fact that plenary exceptions power would act essentially as a veto
over Court decisions rather than a mere "check." If an "exception" were made to Court jurisdic-
tion over one or more acts of Congress, the federal courts' only source of control over Congress
concerning that act would be lost. No balance would exist between these supposedly co-equal
branches. Without plenary exceptions power, each branch retains some control over the other.
See notes 103-09 and accompanying text infra.
72. The Federalist No. 80, at 505 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
This language is vague, especially in the context of the entire essay. Earlier Hamilton had referred
to Congress' removing partial inconveniences in court jurisdiction as a way to protect the judicial
system if unforeseen problems arose. This sounds more like a beneficial regulation of'jurisdiction
than a court-curbing power.
73. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
74. However, an equally plausible interpretation is that the Judiciary Act does not deny a
more fundamental constitutional basis for federal court jurisdiction but merely organized these
powers. The language of article III vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court is worded as a
mandate. Accordingly, one author holds the view that the Judiciary Act was passed to bolster
support for the newly created federal judiciary, although it was not essential to vest in the
Supreme Court authority over the types of cases outlined in article III. Brant, supra note 10, at 12.
75. This doctrine can be attributed to Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in United States v.
More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 170-71 (1805). Significantly, in More the Court did not deny juris-
diction. Also, it did not deal with the power of the Supreme Court to hear an appeal from a state
court.
1982]
NORTH CAtROLINA LW REVIEW
itself, a debatable interpretation of article 111.76
Several legal historians argue that plenary exceptions power would be
anomalous in view of the history and framework of the Constitution, espe-
cially the explicit article III grant of national judicial power to the federal
courts over enumerated classes of cases.7 7 Various alternative opinions on the
intended purpose of the clause have been expressed. One theory is based on a
large body of historical evidence that the framers were concerned with federal
appellate courts reversing findings of fact reached by juries.78 Under this
view, the exceptions clause language was inserted to prevent Supreme Court
usurpation of the role of juries. Court review of factual conclusions could be
checked by congressional legislation permitted by the exceptions clause. This
explanation arguably conflicts with the punctuation of the clause "the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."'7 9 This
has been explained as a mere misplacement of the commas, which leads to the
erroneous reading that the exceptions apply to the removal of court review of
legal as well as factual questions.80 If the comma were correctly placed after
the word "Law" rather than after "Fact," the defect would have been
corrected.
Yet another theory asserts that the exceptions clause was intended not to
permit congressional removal of any substantive area of federal court jurisdic-
tion, but merely to allow Congress to redistribute classes of cases between
original and appellate jurisdiction.8 ' The types of cases that are explicitly
named in article III, section 2, clause 2 as falling within the federal judicial
power could be redistributed from the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to its appellate jurisdiction as needed. Under this theory the exceptions
clause could be used as a safety valve to alleviate the pressures on the Supreme
Court as its original jurisdiction duties become too burdensome. Congress
could delegate these cases to the lower federal courts, subject to ultimate re-
view by the Supreme Court. In effect jurisdiction would be redistributed with-
76. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Ex pane Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (see text accompanying notes 48-50 supra); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-33 (1816).
77. E.g., Berger, supra note 10, at 289 (noting that no indication was found in the records of
the Constitutional Convention that the exceptions clause was designed to withdraw federal court
review over congressional legislation); Forkosch, supra note 10 (concluding that federal judicial
power over constitutional issues was granted by the framers' Constitution); Grinnell, supra note 70
(pointing out the deliberate conceptual change made by the framers of the Constitution to get
away from the British system of direct legislative control over the judiciary).
78. The evidence for this theory is explained in detail in Merry, Scope of the Supreme
Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 53 (1962). See also Berger,
supra note 10, at 285-89.
79. U.S. Cost. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
80. Brant, supra note 10, at 6. There is also support for this theory in Alexander Hamilton's
The Federalist No. 81. Hamilton mentions that the exceptions power of Congress could be used
appropiately to check the Court's reinterpretation of factual conclusions arrived at by juries. The
Federalist No. 81, at 514 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
81. See I W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 616
(1953); Van Aistyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Mfadison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 32.
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out diminishing the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court in these areas.
Alternatively, if a particular type of case originally slated for initial hearing in
the federal district courts became of critical importance, this class would be
transferred to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. This interpretation
can be supported by the placement of the exceptions clause within article III.
The first sentence of article III, section 2, clause 2 concerns the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. The following sentence gives the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction in all other types of cases under its control, setting
off the exceptions clause provision at the end with commas.
A related argument is based on reading the words "exceptions" and "reg-
ulations" conjunctively rather than with separate meanings. Under this theory
the word "exception" should not be read to mean exclusion of classes of cases,
but only variation in the manner in which cases reach the federal courts. Con-
gress could enact any jurisdictional rule short of blocking some ultimate fed-
eral court review of every constitutional issue.82
No matter which theory is used to justify limiting the scope of the con-
gressional exceptions power, historians agree that the framers, in writing the
Constitution, were reacting to a strong need for increased national uniformity
and federal control over the states. They were abandoning the weak and un-
workable Articles of Confederation. Article III of the Constitution, providing
for a federal judiciary, was an integral part of this plan to strengthen the fed-
eral government.8 3 Whether or not the Constitution was originally meant to
grant the Supreme Court a power of judicial review over congressional acts,84
there was a strongly held belief that the laws of the states should be subject to
final review by the Supreme Court. Alexander Hamilton expressed this senti-
ment in his statement in the Federalist that
there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restric-
tions on the authority of the state legislatures, without some constitu-
tional mode of enforcing the observence of them? This power must
either be a direct negative on the state laws, or an authority in the
federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention
of the articles of the Union. There is no third course that I can imag-
ine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention pref-
erable to the former .... 85
82. Hearings, supra note 10, at 68. See also Strong, supra note 10, at 246. Strong, however,
reaches this conclusion by relying on a need for federal supremacy rather than evidence of the
intent of the framers in writing the exceptions clause. He feels that in the rush to finish writing the
Constitution, the framers came to no consensus on what this clause really would mean. Id. at 263.
83. Plenary exceptions power would give Congress authority to return the judiciary to its
condition under the Articles of Confederation with regard to whatever issues Congress might
choose. For these issues (nothing would prevent Congress from applying exceptions power to all
constitutional issues), the state courts would be the only available judicial tribunals even if those
issues were of national importance or subject to state bias.
84. This power was first recognized by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
85. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 72, at 500. This essay also emphasized the necessity of
the uniformity provided by one final and authoritative interpretation of federal law.
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In light of this recognition of a need for final authority in the federal govern-
ment on federal matters, it would be contradictory for the framers to insert in
the Constitution an exceptions power provision to allow Congress to block, at
will, federal court review of state laws that might conflict with the
Constitution.
C Harmonizing the Exceptions Clause with Other Constitutional Provisions
In addition to an historical inquiry, the meaning of the exceptions clause
can be illuminated by its examination relative to other parts of the Constitu-
tion. Because the Constitution was written as a unified charter with the intent
that its various provisions complement each other, analysis of other sections of
the Constitution can aid in defining the meaning and limits of the exceptions
clause. In this approach, the Constitution must be considered not only from
the perspective of needs envisioned in 1789 but also as the flexible charter it
was intended to be.
Entrusting the states with the role of making final interpretations of the
Constitution, under the alleged authority of the exceptions clause, is inconsis-
tent with several other constitutional provisions. The supremacy clause in ar-
ticle VI provides that the "Constitution. . .shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."'8 6 Removal of federal jurisdiction under the exceptions clause would
leave final interpretation of the Constitution on certain issues to the state
courts. Some commentators do not consider this to be a problem. They point
out that the supremacy clause binds state courts as well as federal courts to
follow the federal laws and the Constitution over conflicting state law.87 They
assume that state courts are as dependable as the federal courts in upholding
the mandates of the Constitution. This argument places great faith in the abil-
ity of state courts to render unbiased decisions concerning federal and consti-
tutional law once they are free from the threat of reversal. As pointed out
previously, the underlying rationale of the Helms bill, if it is to provide effec-
tively for a departure from the prohibition on school-sponsored prayer, must
be an assumption that the state courts will depart from the established
Supreme Court cases of Engle and.4bington SchoolDistrict.88 These cases, as
an interpretation of the first amendment by the Supreme Court, are the
supreme law of the land on the school prayer issue.89
86. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2.
87. E.g., Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1005-06. Professor Weschler sees no supremacy clause
or due process restrictions with this arrangement. He points out that state courts, as well as fed-
eral, are bound to uphold the Constitution by the supremacy clause.
Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 267-69, takes an intermediate position, finding no supremacy
clause limitations, but adding qualifications to prevent manipulation of jurisdiction that would
force the Supreme Court to decide cases contrary to the Constitution.
88. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 92 infra.
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Implicit in the concept of federal supremacy is the realization of the need
for uniformity concerning federal law. There is no reason to asssume that, left
on their own, the fifty highest state courts would interpret any constitutional
provision in an identical fashion.90 The Helms bill would set the stage for
differing constitutional interpretations depending on a citizen's residence. Ac-
ceptance of the rationale of the Helms bill conceivably would authorize, for
example, an exercise of congressional exceptions power that would leave to
each state the power to decide to what extent the Bill of Rights should apply
within its borders. This result, although an extreme case, highlights the essen-
tial function of the federal courts in enforcing the supremacy clause.
Early landmark Supreme Court decisions interpreting the article III
power of the federal courts also contradict the exceptions clause interpretation
envisioned by the Prayer Act. The Court has broadly interpreted its article III
grant that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution." 91 In Marbury v. Madison92 Chief Justice
John Marshall settled any doubt that the Supreme Court has the power to
review the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Thirteen years later in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee,93 the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of state laws and state court decisions was confirmed. The
Court in Martin recognized the necessity of federal judicial review to counter
state biases that might interfere with a neutral interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.94 It also emphasized the role of. federal judicial review in ensuring a
uniform interpretation of the Constitution throughout the country. 95
90. The Supreme Court itself periodically changes its interpretation of constitutional lan-
guage when it overrules its prior holdings. Leaving the interpretation to the states would only
multiply the confusion over what actions violate a particular provision of the Constitution such as
the establishment clause.
91. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1(emphasis added). "If, then, it is a duty of congress to vest
the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicialpower." Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330 (1816) (emphasis in original). See also Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
92. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. This role has been affirmed repeatedly to the
present day. The Court recently reasserted that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Court in Cooper made this statement in reply to a different
example of dissatisfaction with and refusal to abide by Supreme Court interpretation of the Con-
stitution. The Supreme Court was answering the contention of Arkansas officials that they were
not bound by the Supreme Court's landmark desegregation decision of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). "The courts of the United States can, without question,
revise [sic] the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are
found to be contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity." Id. at 344.
94. "The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct or
control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice." Id. at 347.
95. "A motive of another kind... is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitu-
tion." Id. at 347-48 (emphasis in original).
Uniformity is especially important when essentially federal issues, such as constitutional
rights, are involved. See Letter from former Assistant Attorney General Alan Parker to Represen-
tative Rodino, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (June 19, 1980) reprinted in Hearings on S.
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
By withdrawing the Supreme Court's power to review state laws dealing
with the first amendment, the Prayer Act directly conflicts with the principles
set forth in Marbury and Martin. It also conflicts with the general trend of the
federal government, including the Supreme Court, to strengthen rather than
weaken its constitutional authority over the laws of the states.96 Conceivably
there would be no limit to congressional tampering with the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction through the exceptions clause. There is no reason why the excep-
tions power would not be applicable to federal review of congressional acts as
well as state laws. Therefore, Congress could pass a law that is clearly uncon-
stitutional and then add a proviso that no federal court would have jurisdic-
tion to review its constitutionality. This would negate the power of judicial
review asserted in Marbury v. Madison and seems contrary to a system of gov-
ernment established with three co-equal branches having separate functions to
perform. A congressional veto over the federal courts' role is not consistent
with this framework.
Another constitutional bar to a broad reading of the exceptions clause is
the fifth amendment.97 Several circuit courts of appeals have held that proce-
dural due process requirements limit the power of Congress to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.98 The Helms bill would foreclose all federal
forums for the vindication of substantive constitutional rights even if state
courts ignored Engle and Abington School District. State court refusal to fol-
low these Supreme Court rulings, coupled with the inability to appeal, argua-
bly would deny access to a fair forum for the adjudication of a first
amendment claim. Lack of access, either initially or by appeal, to an impartial
tribunal that will follow the law as determined by the Supreme Court violates
the procedural requirements of the due process clause.
Although the Court has rejected due process challenges to the replace-
ment of lower federal courts by administrative tribunals, in these cases there
450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980).
96. See C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 74-76 (1969). Black states
that there is no more legitimate function of the federal courts than to review state acts for consis-
tency with the Constitution. The fear of the consequences of leaving to the states the final inter-
pretation of the Constitution has been stated forcefully by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. "I do
not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as
to the laws of the several States." 0. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (1920).
Former Assistant Attorney General John Harmon expressed a similar sentiment to the House
Judiciary Committee: "The Exceptions Clause properly allows Congress to regulate the appellate
jurisdiction in a way that is consistent with the Supremacy Clause, with other Constitutional pro-
visions, and with the Constitutional scheme as a whole. But I do not believe that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that the Exceptions Clause be used, as the 'school prayer amendment'
would use it, to undermine this pillar of the Constitution--the Supreme Court's role in protecting
the integrity and supremacy of federal law." Hearings on S. 450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980) (statement of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General).
97. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. Const. amend. V.
98. See, e.g., Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948). This case also
suggests that Congress' power over federal court jurisdiction does not extend to the Supreme
Court at all. Id. at 257. See also articles cited at note 38 supra.
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was no advance warning that the intent was that the replacement tribunals
would ignore the settled law in exercising their authority. Significantly, the
Supreme Court still retained the power to review the decisions of these admin-
istrative tribunals. In Yakus v. United States9 9 the Supreme Court upheld the
World War II era Emergency Price Control Act provision for an administra-
tive review board that displaced a federal court adjudication. The Court held
that it cannot be assumed in advance that the board would be so unfair as to
deny due process.l ° ° More important, the Court emphasized its own power to
review board decisions, stating that any "[a]ction taken by them is reviewable
in this court and if contrary to due process will be corrected here."10 1 The
Helms bill, by encouraging states to ignore Supreme Court mandates with the
denial of Supreme Court review, destroys this procedural due process
safeguard. 102
While several provisions of the Constitution serve as potential limits on
congressional power to eliminate part of the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction, the Constitution does not leave Congress powerless to check perceived
excesses in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. This
power, however, operates indirectly to maintain an independent judiciary free
from congressional veto or other immediate political manipulation. Congres-
99. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
100. Id. at 434-35. "Only if we could say in advance of resort to statutory procedure that it is
incapable of affording due process to petitioners could we conclude... that their constitutional
rights have been or will be infringed." Id. at 435.
101. Id. at 434.
102. The equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, see,
e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), might also be an obstacle to the removal of Supreme
Courtjurisdiction. One commentator used an equal protection argument to attack a bill to restrict
federal court review of obscenity verdicts. See Comment, supra note 38, at 310-11. Under the
proposed restrictions, one aspect of the first amendment would receive no federal protection, while
all other aspects of the first amendment, and all other constitutional rights, still would be subject
to Supreme Court scrutiny without any legitimate legislative purpose to justify the disparate treat-
ment. It can hardly be maintained that preventing the Supreme Court from applying the first
amendment is a valid justification. To satisfy the equal protection clause, it is suggested that the
alternative would be to eliminate all Supreme Court review of the Bill of Rights, a politically
unfeasible option. This argument is equally applicable to the denial of review of establishment
clause cases.
An argument based on the fourteenth amendment is offered by supporters of the Helms bill
in support of their contention that Congress can shape the federal courts' enforcement of constitu-
tional rights. They contend that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which permits Congress
to enforce the fourteenth amendment with appropriate legislation, could be used to protect the
first amendment right of free exercise of religion, which they claim was infringed by the Supreme
Court in Engle and Abinglon School District. It is reasoned that the removal of jurisdiction would
be appropriate congressional legislation under section 5 to accomplish the purpose of "restoring
free exercise" of religion in schools. See Methvin, Should Prayer Be Restored to Our Public
Schools?, Readers Digest, Sept. 1979, at 88, reprinted in 125 Cong. Rec. 14,735 (1979). See also
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 16, 1979, at 6, col. 1, reprinted in 125 Cong. Rec. S5453
(daily ed. May 7, 1979).
This argument misconstrues the purpose of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Senator
Helms is trying to redefine rather than enforce constitutional rights. The Court has ruled that
school-sponsored prayer is not a component of free exercise and that it violates the establishment
clause. Although Congress can pass legislation "to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), it cannot pass laws to restrict
them. Id. at n.10. The Helms bill would curtail the right to be free from government establish-
ment of religion.
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sional control is exercised principally through Senate confirmation of Supreme
Court nominees 0 3 and through the power to impeach Supreme Court jus-
tices.' °4 In addition, a far more powerful congressional tool is provided by the
Constitution to overrule Supreme Court rulings perceived to be objectionable.
This power, outlined in article V, authorizes Congress to initiate constitutional
amendments. 0 5 If a particular Supreme Court holding is sought to be cir-
cumvented or overruled, an amendment explicitly can prevent the continued
adherence to the Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision.
Enacting a constitutional amendment is, by design, a difficult process. The
framers recognized that the fundamental charter should not be changed by the
views of a simple majority and that the rights of those with unpopular posi-
tions should not be cast aside by the feelings of a simple majority of legislators
with the acquiescence of the President. A proposed amendment must be fa-
vored by a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress, in addition to ratifica-
tion by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Under the Helms interpretation
of the exceptions clause, Congress could remove issues of constitutional law
from federal court jurisdiction with the simple majority required to pass any
bill. Assuming that state courts' interpretations of the Constitution would dif-
fer from those of the Supreme Court, this effectively amounts to a change in
the meaning of the Constitution without following the more arduous process
of congressional passage and state ratification of a constitutional amendment.
An interpretation of the exceptions clause that would so severely undercut the
protection provided by article V raises serious questions concerning its
validity.
If the Congress and the people of this country have an overwhelming
desire to abolish the church/state separation as outlined in the first amend-
ment and interpreted by the Supreme Court, they are not without legitimate
means to do so. In fact, a constitutional amendment concerning "voluntary"
prayer was proposed in 1979,106 but it was defeated. The constitutional
amendment process should not be bypassed by veiled efforts to enact rejected
amendments by a mere majority vote.107
To allow circumvention of article V by a majority vote would set a prece-
dent that could be applied to other rights.108 The exceptions power could be
103. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
104. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
105. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution .... " U.S. Coast. art. V.
At least four amendments have been enacted to overcome Supreme Court decisions. For
example, the eleventh amendment was proposed and eventually enacted in response to Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
106. 125 Cong. Rec. S17640 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1979) & H190 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979). This
constitutional amendment has also been proposed several times in the past. See Rice, The Prayer
Amendment: A Justification, 24 S.C.L. Rev. 705 (1972).
107. As expressed by Senator Mathias, "What the amendment is really trying to do is find a
back door for changing the organic law of the country. It bypasses article V of the Constitution,
Constitutional interpretations are subject to change either by the process provided within the Con-
stitution itself or when the Supreme Court alters one of its prior constitutional holdings." 125
Cong. Rec. S4142 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1979) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
108. See id. S4140 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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used to pass a law preventing the Supreme Court or any other federal court
from reviewing a congressional act or state authorization of blatant discrimi-
nation against a particular religion or race, or the imposition of government
censorship. In the most extreme case, an exception to Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion conceivably could bar the Court from interpreting the entire Constitution.
Plenary exceptions power in the Constitution would be self-defeating to the
point of making the Constitution superfluous beyond whatever nonreviewable
respect might be accorded it by Congress and individual state courts. 09
D. The Ineffectiveness of the Exceptions Clause in Countering Objectionable
Supreme Court Holdings
Apart from the apparent unconstitutionality of the Helms bill, congres-
sional passage would render it enforceable law for at least some period before
judicial scrutiny could be completed. Even during this interim, the Helms bill
might not accomplish its goal of restoring school prayer.' 10 Because the term
"voluntary prayer" is not self-defining, the Helms bill would necessitate that
federal courts accept school prayer cases to determine whether the case fell
within the area over which they are forbidden to take jurisdiction. Rather
than neatly removing a class of cases from federal court jurisdiction, the bill
would embroil the federal courts in the very issue Congress intended to re-
move from their scrutiny. Nothing would prevent the federal courts from
again ruling that school-sanctioned prayer is not voluntary, as was held in
Engle and Abington School District."'
It must be stressed that, theoretically, removal of federal court jurisdiction
in voluntary prayer cases should not automatically change the law. State
courts still would be bound to interpret the first amendment establishment
clause in accord with the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in Engle and
Abington School District. Only by ignoring the precedents that the the
supremacy clause requires them to follow could state courts uphold laws al-
lowing school-supervised prayers. Although supporters of the Helms bill ad-
vocate this position," 2 it seems a dangerous and divisive tactic that would
have a negative impact on the integrity of the entire judicial system, which is
109. Professor Hart argues that the exceptions power cannot be used by Congress to destroy
the "essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." Hart, supra note 10, at 1365.
See generally Ratner, supra note 10. It could be argued that an exception relating to one small
area would not destroy this "essential role." It is difficult, however, to see when a line could be
drawn between a permissible and an impermissible number of exceptions to constitutional rights.
Therefore, Supreme Court review of all constitutional issues is essential.
110. Of course these practical obstacles to Senator Helms' goal cast doubt on the plausibility
of a constitutional interpretation of the exceptions clause that would bring them about.
111. The meaning given to "voluntary prayer" by the backers of the Helms bill is especially
misleading in light of the Supreme Court decisions holding that school-sponsored prayer is not
voluntary. It is possible, but unlikely given the clear legislative intent, that the Supreme Court
would interpret the Helms bill so as not to conflict with Engle and Abington School District.
112. See notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text supra. See also C. Rice, Congress and
Supreme Court Jurisdiction 20 (March 1980) (pamphlet published by the American Family
Institute).
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intended to operate under the rule of law. It is highly unpredictable in which
states, if any, the Prayer Act would accomplish its goal.
Assuming that state courts would not deviate from Supreme Court prece-
dents, the Helms bill could not accomplish its goal. Ironically, it would fore-
close any possibility of realizing the goals it is trying to effect. Without federal
court jurisdiction, "[f]ederal law would be frozen in whatever state it hap-
pened to be at the moment."'1 3 New constitutional interpretations of the es-
tablishment clause would be impossible. The Supreme Court would have no
way to overrule or modify Engle and Abington School District. Any opportu-
nity for a "full and fair airing of the issues"' 1 4 involved and for possible doc-
trinal changes" 5 would be precluded so long as the Helms bill was binding
law.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Voluntary School Prayer Act were passed by Congress, it would
provide an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to decide squarely the
extent of power conferred on Congress to exclude specific constitutional issues
from the federal courts. In that determination the Supreme Court should hold
the Act unconstitutional. It conflicts with both the historical and the modem
understanding of judicial power established in the Constitution. Further, it is
an impractical vehicle for implementing the goal sought. Undoubtedly the
Supreme Court will realize the potential harm implicit in unlimited congres-
sional exceptions power. The Court cannot allow a precedent that could be
used to remove important constitutional questions from federal judicial con-
trol. Nor can it take the first step towards the inevitable judicial chaos that
would result from a judicial system functioning without uniform decision-
making. The Supreme Court should not surrender its paramount role as the
final arbitrator of the meaning of the Constitution. 16
JOEL DAVID FARREN
113. See 125 Cong. Rec. S4144 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy, quoting
letter from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Sen. Ribicoff, Chairman of Senate Government Oper-
ations Committee (Apr. 9, 1979)).
114. Id.
115. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Abington SchoolDistrict raises several possible solutions
to accommodate the right of free exercise with the prohibition of the establishment clause. 370
U.S. at 294-304 (Brennan, J., concurring). Time could be set aside by schools for meditation or
rest and could be used by individuals to pray by themselves.
116. It has been predicted that the Court would not "submit to its own emasculation." See
Grinnell, supra note 70, at 651 (responding to Justice Roberts' proposed constitutional amend-
ment to eliminate congressional exceptions power). In retrospect, Justice Roberts' amendment,
see note 40 supra, would have eliminated a great deal of subsequent uncertainty. It would have
put an end to a series of bills of highly questionable constitutionality, designed to curtail the
Supreme Court's role in protecting individual rights.
[Vol. 60
